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This article analyses costly information acquisition in asset markets with Knightian uncertainty about
the asset fundamentals. In these markets, acquiring information not only reduces the expected variability
of the fundamentals for a given distribution (i.e. risk). It also mitigates the uncertainty about the true
distribution of the fundamentals. Agents who lack knowledge of this distribution cannot correctly interpret
the information other investors impound into the price. We show that, due to uncertainty aversion, the
incentives to reduce uncertainty by acquiring information increase as more investors acquire information.
When uncertainty is high enough, information acquisition decisions become strategic complements and
lead to multiple equilibria. Swift changes in information demand can drive large price swings even after
small changes in Knightian uncertainty.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A basic tenet of financial economics holds that asset markets help summarize information
dispersed across individual investors. But what information do asset prices transmit?
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that as more agents acquire information, it becomes easier
to free-ride on the (costly) learning of others merely by observing the asset price. The value of
information diminishes with information acquisition.
The case for such a well-articulated role of the asset price relies on a number of assumptions
that have become standard. This article relaxes what is arguably the most standard of them:
that uncertainty can be quantified probabilistically. We consider a model in which the market
fundamentals are subject to ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty (Keynes 1921; Knight 1921).
In this market, aversion to ambiguity provides incentives to acquire information, incentives that
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increase with information acquisition. This property leads to a host of new conclusions about the
informational role of asset prices.
Our results rely on a framework in which uninformed investors face Knightian uncertainty
while attempting to glean information from the equilibrium price. We solve for the equilibrium
in this asset market with asymmetric information, and then analyse endogenous information
acquisition. The central element of our analysis is the agents’ attitude vis-à-vis the information
that prices reveal: how much of a price change can be attributed to new information, and how
much to a liquidity shock? When uninformed investors are uncertain about the true distribution of
the information held by the informed, this question cannot be given a precise probabilistic answer.
In this market, the value of acquiring information has two components. The first accounts for the
marginal value of reducing the riskiness of the fundamentals for any given prior distribution of
returns—the standard Grossman and Stiglitz component. The second relates to how valuable it
is for an ambiguity averse agent to resolve his ambiguity—the “value of parameter uncertainty”.
We show that the value of parameter uncertainty increases precisely as prices become more
informative. If uncertainty is high enough, it dominates the standard Grossman–Stiglitz free-
riding effect. Information complementarities result: the larger the mass of informed agents, the
higher the benefits of becoming informed.
Why is resolving ambiguity more valuable when there are more informed agents? As it turns
out, the value of parameter uncertainty lies in the benefit of forming portfolio decisions based on
the true distribution of the information revealed by the price. This benefit is high precisely when
prices incorporate more information on the fundamentals. Consider two polar cases:
In the first, no agent pays for information, and hence the equilibrium price at t =1, say, contains
no information and is unambiguous (albeit risky because of liquidity trading) from an ex ante
perspective (i.e. before trading and before the arrival of information, at t =0). However, returns
from trading are ambiguous from an ex ante perspective because they amount to the ambiguous
asset payoff less the unambiguous price. In this case, knowledge of the true return distribution at
t =1 provides an informational advantage only when the true expected returns differ from those
the uninformed investors impound into the equilibrium price. Ex ante, however, this informational
advantage cannot be quantified probabilistically because the true return distribution is ambiguous.
Thus, an ambiguity averse agent will give this advantage little weight as he formulates his choice
over whether to pay for information. The value of parameter uncertainty is small.
At the other extreme, if all agents pay for information, then the price encodes important
information about payoffs and is therefore ambiguous from an ex ante perspective. In contrast
to the previous case, the anticipated returns are less ambiguous ex ante: they are the difference
between the ambiguous payoff and the ambiguous price, and so the ambiguity “cancels out”
as the price fully incorporates information about the asset payoff. However, knowledge about
the probability distribution of the asset payoffs is valuable, because it provides the uninformed
investors with a “code” for correctly interpreting the information conveyed through the price.
This feature of our model is illustrated by the following example. The three-color Ellsberg urn
contains 30 red balls and a total of 60 black and yellow balls.1 Informed decision makers know
the ratio of black to yellow balls, whereas the uninformed do not. At date-0, decision makers face
a bet that pays 0 if a red ball is drawn and $1 otherwise—a clearly unambiguous bet. The bet will
be resolved at date-2. However, there is an interim date-1 at which it will become known whether
the drawn ball is black or not. If the drawn ball is black, then the date-2 payoffs are known at
date-1. However, if the drawn ball is not black, then at date-1 the decision maker knows that the
drawn ball will be either red or yellow, but does not know which one it will be. Informed decision
1. Similar examples have been employed in the decision theory literature (e.g. Epstein and Schneider, 2003;
Hanany and Klibanoff, 2007, 2009; Siniscalchi, 2011).
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makers can use Bayes’ law and determine the probability of red or yellow, but the uninformed
cannot, as the payoffs are no longer unambiguous. That is, learning about the ratio of black and
yellow balls is valuable for forecasting the outcome of the bet precisely because of the information
available at date-1.
In our model, the asset payoff is f =θ+, where θ is ambiguous (its mean is unknown), but
can be learnt at some cost, and where  has a known distribution. When all agents are informed,
the price, p, moves one-to-one with the investors’ private information θ , that is p=θ−z, where
z is the random asset supply. Asset returns, R, are unambiguous as a result, R= f −p=+z.
Even if the returns are unambiguous (tantamount to the unambiguous bet that places $1 on “not-
red” in the urn example), p reveals information that is useful for forecasting R: R and p have z in
common. However, p contains ambiguous information, θ , and is not very useful unless one knows
the probability distribution of θ (just as the information “not-black” is not very useful unless one
knows the original composition of balls in the urn in Ellsberg’s example). For instance, a low
realization of p should not be interpreted as good news for future returns if the unknown mean
of θ is very low (just as the information “not-black” does not imply high chances of getting $1
if there are few yellow balls in the urn). An uninformed agent’s portfolio decision will reflect
his aversion to this uncertainty. However, whether the resulting decision correctly accounts for
the true meaning of the price realization ultimately depends on the true distribution of θ , which
is ambiguous ex ante. Hence, while assessing the implications of remaining uninformed, an
ambiguity averse investor fears making the wrong portfolio decision in light of price information.
The value of parameter uncertainty is higher when prices incorporate information than when they
do not.
Akey prediction of our model is that in markets with ambiguity aversion, the value of parameter
uncertainty increases when asset prices are sufficiently informative. Note that what is crucial is
not merely the ambiguity, but the aversion to it. Critically, we show that in the smooth ambiguity
extension of our baseline model (see below), higher-order uncertainty does not lead to information
complementarities, unless agents are ambiguity averse.
It is well known that information complementarities can lead to multiple equilibria (Section 5).
Our model and its extensions do indeed predict multiple equilibria. Outcomes such as history-
dependent prices, market crashes, rebounds, and overshoots can result even from small changes
in the uncertainty about the fundamentals. These properties help isolate new testable predictions
regarding a largely unexplored issue: the market reaction to positive uncertainty shocks. Our
model predicts that the initial reaction to a series of uncertainty shocks will be a market drop,
led by reduced market participation, and followed by a sustained rally. The rally occurs because
the increased uncertainty induces the uninformed agents to learn about these shocks, which fuels
complementarities in information acquisition and price overshoots.
Our main model relies on a market in which agents have maxmin expected utility, as in
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In this market, uninformed investors extract information from
the equilibrium price through full Bayesian learning, by updating each initial prior. Uninformed
investors are also sophisticated, in that they correctly anticipate their future choices (portfolio
policies) in light of new information (the equilibrium price), an assumption that has been known
as consistent planning since Strotz (1955–1956). However, our main conclusions are resilient to
a variety of model extensions and alternative treatments of ambiguity, including (i) maximum
likelihood updating, (ii) portfolio policies to which agents pre-commit before trading, and (iii)
smooth specifications of ambiguity aversion as in Klibanoff, et al. (2005), which allow us to
disentangle ambiguity from ambiguity aversion within the context of our study.
The article is organized as follows. The next section provides perspective on our contribution
in light of the existing literature. Section 3 sets the model assumptions and analyses the asset
market equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the value of information in the asset market with
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Knightian uncertainty. Section 5 analyses endogenous information acquisition and deals with
information complementarities, multiple equilibria, and the asset price swings that occur as a
result. Section 6 provides the extensions. Section 7 concludes. The appendices contain details
omitted from the main text. Proofs for Section 6 are in the Online Appendices D to F available
as Supplementary Material.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
This article contributes to two strands of literature. First, it analyses how Knightian uncertainty
about fundamentals affects assets and information markets in an otherwise standard noisy rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) model. Secondly, it provides insights into the economic incentives
for mitigating model uncertainty through costly information acquisition. To date, much of the
literature on Knightian uncertainty does rely on a representative agent framework;2 on the other
hand, the REE literature typically ignores the distinction between risk and ambiguity. Some
exceptions are Caskey (2009) and Ozsoylev and Werner (2011), who rely on noisy supply for
partial revelation, as in our article, and Condie and Ganguli (2011, 2012) and Easley et al. (2011),
who do not. While these papers deal with informational properties of asset prices in markets with
ambiguity, our focus is on the value of fundamental information in these markets.
In the existing REE literature, information complementarities can occur because as more
agents acquire information, the price actually becomes less informative, making it more valuable
for uninformed agents to acquire private information. This property can arise due to different
mechanisms. In Barlevi and Veronesi (2008), it is a negative correlation between noisy supply
and fundamentals. In Chamley (2010), it is the possibility of independent jumps in noise trading
and fundamentals. In Breon-Drish (2010), it is departures from normality of noise trading and
fundamentals that lead to a failure of the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) of the signal
conveyed by the price.3 In Rahi and Zigrand (2014), the mechanism is the heterogeneity in agents’
private asset valuations. In Avdis’ (2011) dynamic model, more informed investors lead to prices
being more informative about dividends but less informative about the liquidity shocks that drive
short-term price movements. Finally, Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Manzano and Vives (2011)
show the existence of multiple linear equilibria in the price function when agents have private
information about both dividends and supply. In one of these equilibria, the price signal-to-noise
ratio decreases in the fraction of informed agents; when agents coordinate on this equilibrium,
there are complementarities in information acquisition.
In contrast to the previous papers, information complementarities arise in our model despite
the fact that more information acquisition leaves the uninformed agents with lower conditional
risk and lower conditional ambiguity.
Other models also predict complementarities despite the price signal-to-noise ratio increasing
with information acquisition. However, the mechanisms in these models hinge on different
channels. In Veldkamp (2006), the mechanism relies on a cost of information that decreases
with information demand. In García and Strobl (2011), the mechanism relies on consumption
complementarities that result from relative wealth concerns. In the sequential trade model of
Chamley (2007), more informed trading makes current prices more informative but future prices
more uncertain; the latter effect may increase the value of information for short-term investors.
2. Cao et al., (2005) and Easley and O’Hara (2009) contain early analyses of how ambiguity affects participation
in Walrasian markets with heterogeneous agents.
3. Breon-Drish (2010) also provides a numerical example of complementarities in a setup in which the MLRPholds
but uninformed agents’ demands are backward-bending over some range. This feature of backward-bending demands
further differentiates our article—the uninformed demand is downward sloping in all versions of our model.
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Our channel relies on the incentives to form portfolio decisions based on the true distribution
of the fundamentals. Due to ambiguity aversion, these incentives increase when more investors
acquire information and impound it into the asset price.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. Agents and assets
We consider a market for a risky asset, with payoff equal to f =θ+, where θ ∼N (μ,ωθ ) and ∼
N (0,ω). As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the market is populated by a continuum of agents,
with a fraction λ of informed and a fraction 1−λ of uninformed agents. Informed agents observe
θ at cost c>0. We initially take λ as given and consider endogenous information acquisition in
the following sections. The asset supply is z∼N (μz,ωz). We assume that ωθ >0 (asymmetric
information), ω >0 (partial resolution of risk by private information), ωz >0 (partial information
revelation), and that all variables are independent. A riskless asset is also available for trading; it
is in perfectly elastic supply, and yields a rate of return equal to zero. All agents have negative
exponential utility u with constant absolute risk aversion τ , that is u(W)=−e−τW . Initial wealth
is normalized to zero.
3.2. Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion
Our point of departure from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is the assumption that all agents are
ex ante uncertain about the expected value of the fundamentals f . Although they are unable
to assess what μ is, they believe it belongs to some interval, μ∈[μ,μ¯]. We assume that μ=
μ0− 12μ and μ¯=μ0+ 12μ, for some μ≥0, and set μ0 =0.
In this and the following two sections, we assume that agents display preferences in the form
of the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This assumption does not
allow us to disentangle the notion of uncertainty from that of the attitude towards it. For example,
we cannot tell whether an increased length of interval, μ, reflects more uncertainty or more
uncertainty aversion. Unless otherwise stated, we shall favour a cognitive interpretation of μ.
In Section 6.3, we rely on the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, et al. (2005), which allows
for a separation of tastes and beliefs. Our conclusions about complementarities and multiple
equilibria remain unaffected in this framework.4
3.3. Informed agents
By observing the realization of θ , informed agents resolve their ambiguity straight away. They
choose portfolio holdings xI to maximize the expected utility of their final wealth WI =(f −p)xI −
c, where p is the observed asset price. Standard arguments yield
xI (θ,p)= E( f |θ,p)−p
τVar( f |θ,p) =
θ−p
τω
. (3.1)
Naturally, while informed agents are able to dissipate their ambiguity, they cannot eliminate
risk. Conditional upon θ , the fundamentals, f , are still normally distributed with expectation θ
and variance ω .
4. Other non-smooth models include, among others, the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler (1989) and
the α-maxmin expected utility model of Ghirardato et al., (2004). The latter has the property of separating ambiguity and
ambiguity attitude. Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) provide a survey of the decision-theoretic literature on ambiguity.
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3.4. Uninformed agents
Uncertainty about the expected value of the fundamentals, μ, leads the uninformed agents to
choose portfolio holdings so as to maximize
min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
(
−e−τWU
∣∣∣p)=−e−τ minμ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ(WU |p)+ 12 τ 2var(WU |p), (3.2)
where WU =(f −p)xU , xU is the asset demand, and Eμ(·) is the expectation operator taken under
the assumption that E(θ)=μ.
The criterion underlying Equation (3.2) is the maxmin expected utility axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). While formulating portfolio decisions, agents learn from the price
and update each of their beliefs. This rule is known as full Bayesian updating. It was proposed by
Jaffray (1992), among others, and axiomatized by Pires (2002). In Section 6.1, we solve for an
alternative updating rule, based on the maximum likelihood principle. This alternative assumption
does not affect our main conclusions on information acquisition based on full Bayesian updating.
We conjecture that, for every pair (θ,z), the equilibrium price function is P(θ,z). We look for
an equilibrium in which the uninformed agents sell the asset when the price is sufficiently high
and buy the asset when the price is sufficiently low, in a sense made precise below. This search
process leads to a simpler problem, that of determining the expectation of the fundamentals when
the agents buy and when the agents sell. Accordingly, we introduce the following notation:
Ebuy ( f |P(·,·)=p)≡Eμ( f |P(·,·)=p), Esell ( f |P(·,·)=p)≡Eμ¯ ( f |P(·,·)=p).
We conjecture that the solution to the uninformed agents’ problem is
xU (p,P(·,·))=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ebuy ( f |P(·,·)=p)−p
τVar( f |P(·,·)=p) , for p<E
buy ( f |P(·,·)=p)
0, for p∈
[
Ebuy ( f |P(·,·)=p),Esell ( f |P(·,·)=p)
]
Esell ( f |P(·,·)=p)−p
τVar( f |P(·,·)=p) , for p>E
sell ( f |P(·,·)=p)
(3.3)
That is, the uninformed agents do not participate in the market unless the equilibrium price
is “favorable” enough. Precisely, the uninformed agents enter the market as buyers (sellers) only
if the price realization, p, is lower (higher) than the agents’ worst-case scenario expectation of
the asset value, conditional on p. Hence, participation involves a fixed-point problem in which
the expectation of the asset value, conditional on the price realization, is equal to the same price
realization:
Ebuy( f |P(·,·)=p)=p and Esell ( f |P(·,·)= p¯)= p¯. (3.4)
The uninformed agents buy the asset when the price realization, p, is below p, and sell the asset
when p is above p¯. They do not trade if the price realization is such that p∈[p,p¯]. Such situations of
portfolio inertia were first linked with Knightian uncertainty by Dow and Werlang (1992). In our
model, the cut-offs p and p¯ are determined in equilibrium, and so is the extent of the uninformed
agents’ market participation.
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3.5. Equilibrium
We conjecture that the equilibrium price function is P(θ,z)=P(s(θ,z)), where s(θ,z) is the
compound signal, defined as
s(θ,z)= λ
τω
θ−(z−μz). (3.5)
From the market-clearing condition,
(1−λ)xU (p,P(·))+λxI (θ,p)=z, (3.6)
we see that the compound signal is observationally equivalent to the equilibrium price. Therefore,
the equilibrium in this market is also one in which uninformed agents condition the expectation
of the asset value upon the observation of the compound signal.
We have:
Proposition 1. (Asset market equilibrium). The equilibrium price is piecewise linear in the
compound signal s given in equation (3.5), as follows:
P(s)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a+bs, for s<s
a+ τω
λ
s, for s∈ [s,s¯]
a¯+bs, for s> s¯
(3.7)
for constants a,a¯,a,b given in Appendix A. The threshold values for the compound signal, s,s¯,
satisfy
s= λ
τω
μ+ ωs
ωz
μz, s¯−s= λ
τω
μ, (3.8)
where ωs is the variance of s. Finally, we have p=a+bs and p¯= a¯+bs¯, with p< p¯.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium price described in Proposition 1 when the fraction of informed
agents is, respectively, λ=0.2 (top panel) and λ=0.5 (bottom). The solid line is the price in the
presence of ambiguity, μ>0, and the dashed line is the price in the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) model.
The portfolio choice given in equation (3.3) reflects returns expected in worst-case scenarios.
In equilibrium, the uninformed agents buy if s<s (sell if s> s¯) but they buy or sell less than they
would do in the absence of ambiguity. As a result, the price is lower (higher) than in Grossman
and Stiglitz for low (high) realizations of the compound signal, s. Naturally, the price impact of
the uninformed agents is reduced as λ increases.
When the signal realization lies within the range [s,s¯], the uninformed agents do not participate.
Note that both s and s¯ increase with the average asset supply μz, reflecting an increased probability
that the uninformed agents will be buyers. Proposition 1 also tells us that the threshold difference,
s¯−s, equals the size of the ambiguity, μ, weighted by the risk-bearing capacity of the informed
agents, λτω . Indeed, consider the following comparative statics. If μ increases, E
buy ( f |P(·,·)=p)
increases as well, for each price realization p. Thus, the threshold equilibrium price p has to
increase (and, hence, so does s), according to the fixed-point problem in equation (3.4); similarly,
s¯ decreases as μ¯ decreases.
While the size of the non-participation region is proportional to the informed risk-bearing
capacity, the comparative statics of the probability of non-participation for a fixed prior μ∈[μ,μ¯]
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Figure 1
This figure depicts the equilibrium asset price given in Proposition 1, as a function of the compound signal, s. Both
panels compare the price function with the Grossman–Stiglitz linear function (the dashed line), which arises in the
absence of ambiguity, that is, when μ=0. The region delimited by the vertical dashed lines corresponds to the
uninformed agents’ non-participation region. The parameter values are μ=2, ωθ =ω =ωz =τ =1, and μz =0. In the
top panel, the proportion of informed agents, λ=0.2, and in the bottom panel, λ=0.5.
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can display non-monotonicities depending on parameter values. This probability is determined
by both the size of the non-participation region, s¯−s, and the distribution of the signal defined in
equation (3.5), both of which depend on the informed risk-bearing capacity, λτω . For example,
larger values of λ increase both the non-participation region and the variance of the signal.
However, if the average asset supply μz is small, then a more volatile signal (for a fixed
s¯−s) implies that non-participation is less likely. When λ is small, the signal’s volatility has
second-order effects, such that the probability of non-participation increases with λ. When λ is
sufficiently high, the effects of the signal’s variability may dominate, such that the probability of
non-participation could decrease with λ.
4. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
This section analyses how ambiguity affects the incentives to acquire fundamental information.
Agents decide whether to become informed before trading, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
and assess their information choices based at worst-case scenarios. The value of acquiring
information reflects not only a reduction in the payoff risk, but also the agents’ aversion to
ambiguity. We decompose the value of information into two components that summarize these
two effects.
4.1. Informed agents
Acquiring private information allows an agent to observe the ambiguous portion of the asset
payoff. Thus, information acquisition reduces the conditional risk and eliminates the conditional
ambiguity of the payoff. Because information is only known after it has been paid for, a would-be
informed agent faces ambiguity ex ante regarding the distribution of the θ that he will observe at
the trading stage. In Appendix B, we show that his ex ante utility is,
UI (c,λ)= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τWˆI
]
=eτc
√
ω f |θ
ω f |s
·U¯U (λ), (4.1)
where WˆI is the wealth generated by the portfolio choice given by equation (3.1), ω f |θ =ω , and
ω f |s is the variance of f conditional on s (equation (5.1)); finally, the two expressions,
U¯U (λ)≡ min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τ C¯(s;μ)
]
, −e−τ C¯(s;μ)=max
x
Eμ
[
−e−τx(f −p)
∣∣∣s], (4.2)
denote the ex ante utility (U¯U ) and the expected utility at the trading stage (−e−τ C¯) conditional
only on (i) the equilibrium price p (equivalently, the compound signal s ) and (ii) full knowledge
(at the trading stage) of the otherwise ambiguous expected value of θ , μ. Equivalently, C¯ is the
certainty equivalent at the trading stage for a hypothetical uninformed agent who only faces risky
choices. This representation of the informed utility plays a crucial role in explaining the main
determinants of information acquisition. Appendix B provides closed-form expressions for the
expectations in equation (4.2) and the certainty equivalent C¯.
4.2. Uninformed agents and consistent planning
An agent who remains uninformed anticipates making portfolio choices while lacking knowledge
of the payoff distribution. Aversion to this uncertainty affects his ex ante utility. We describe this
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effect in terms of a welfare loss with respect to the benchmark in which the agent only faces risky
portfolio choices, U¯U (λ) in equation (4.2).
Let us denote by xU (s)≡xU (p,P(θ,z)) the portfolio choice of the uninformed agent in
equation (3.3), and by x¯U (s;μ) the solution to the maximization problem in equation (4.2),
xU (s)= x¯U (s;μ)+ Eμ
∗(s) ( f |s)−Eμ( f |s)
τω f |s
, μ∗(s)=arg min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]
∣∣Eμ( f |s)−P(s)∣∣. (4.3)
Note that Eμ∗(s) ( f |s) is the worst-case scenario estimate of the asset value that the uninformed
agent formulates while trading in state s (e.g. μ∗(s)=μ when the agent buys; Section 3). While
evaluating his ex ante welfare, the uninformed agent anticipates that his future portfolio choice
in state s will reflect such a worst-case scenario estimate. When gauged through a generic prior
μ, this estimate is deemed biased, in that it leads to a portfolio decision that conflicts with the
choice he would have made had he known μ at the trading stage. Clearly, xU (s) = x¯U (s;μ) in all
states s in which μ∗(s) differs from μ. In Appendix B, we show that this bias can be accounted
for as a discount on C¯ (s;μ). Precisely, we show that the ex ante utility of an uninformed agent
can be expressed as
UU (λ)= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τWˆU
]
= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μ)−T (s;μ))], (4.4)
where WˆU denotes the wealth generated by the portfolio choice given in equation (3.3), and
T (s;μ)≡ 1
2τω f |s
(
Eμ∗(s) ( f |s)−Eμ( f |s)
)2
. (4.5)
The term inside the expectation in the second equality of equation (4.4) is the expectation
under prior μ of terminal utility conditional on price information. It has two terms: one accounting
for the risk-only profit certainty equivalent C¯ (s;μ) in equation (4.2), and another relating to
ambiguity effects, T (s;μ). If the agent knew the true distribution at the trading stage (i.e. μ),
xU (s) in equation (4.3) would collapse to x¯U (s;μ) or, equivalently, the discount T (s;μ) would
be trivially zero, and UU (λ) would collapse to U¯U (λ). The term T (s;μ) is given a closed-form
expression in Appendix B (equation (B.11)). It links to the intertemporal tussles described by
Strotz (1955–1956), in contexts where preferences may conflict at different decision points.
Violation of dynamic consistency is a well-known phenomenon arising in contexts with
ambiguity (Epstein and Schneider 2003). Appendix B illustrates that in our model with
asymmetric information, there exist alternative state-contingent portfolio policies to xU (·) in
equation (4.3), yielding an ex ante utility higher than UU (λ). Intuitively, a state-contingent
portfolio policy xU (s) could be chosen such that the uninformed agents could buy or sell more
than indicated by equation (4.3) and achieve a higher ex ante utility (see the parametric example
in Appendix B, equation (B.13)). The loss T (s;μ) arises because the uninformed agents take into
account that their state-contingent portfolio policy deviates from the one they would formulate
ex ante. In other words, agents are sophisticated, in that they adopt a strategy described by Strotz
(1955–1956) as one of consistent planning.5 Committing to a predetermined portfolio policy is an
alternative way of dealing with these intertemporal conflicts. This strategy is described by Strotz
as one of pre-commitment. In Section 6.2, we extend our results to a model with pre-commitment.
5. Siniscalchi (2011) develops a decision-theoretic treatment of consistent planning based on trees rather than
temporal acts. His approach goes beyond the “multiple-selves” approach introduced by Strotz to deal with intertemporal
conflicts.
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4.3. Equilibrium demand for information
The value of acquiring private information can be decomposed into two parts: one relating to the
benefits of resolving ambiguity before trading, and another summarizing the value of learning
the realization of θ in addition to the unknown distribution (i.e. μ) before trading. Let G (c,λ)≡
− 1τ ln
(UI (c,λ)
UU (λ)
)
denote the net gain from becoming informed, defined as the difference between
the ex ante profit certainty equivalent of the informed and that of the uninformed. By equations
(4.1), (4.2), and (4.4), it is given by
G (c,λ)=−1
τ
ln
(UI (c,λ)
U¯U (λ)
)
− 1
τ
ln
(
U¯U (λ)
UU (λ)
)
= 1
2τ
ln
(
ω f |s
ω f |θ
)
−c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Grossman–Stiglitz effect
+ 1
τ
ln
⎛
⎝EμU
[
e−τ (C¯(s;μU )−T (s;μU ))
]
EμI
[
e−τ C¯(s;μI )
]
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of parameter uncertainty
, (4.6)
where μI and μU solve the two problems described in equations (4.1) and (4.4).
The R.H.S. of equation (4.6) measures the value of information, net of the cost c, for a given
fraction λ of informed agents. An equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition is defined
in the standard way. An interior equilibrium is a fraction of informed agents λ∗ ∈(0,1) that causes
any agent to be ex ante indifferent over whether to be informed or not, that is, G(c,λ∗)=0. The
non-interior equilibria are λ∗=0 such that G (c,0)≤0, and λ∗=1 such that G (c,1)≥0.
The value of information has two components, as anticipated. The first is the marginal value
of reducing the riskiness of the fundamentals for any given prior distribution of returns. It is
monotonically decreasing in λ, as explained below (equation (5.1)). It actually coincides with
the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) value of information, summarizing the usual trade-off
between the cost of acquiring information and its benefits in a market without ambiguity, that is,
where μ=0.
The second component, labelled “value of parameter uncertainty,” summarizes how valuable
it is for an ambiguity averse agent to resolve ambiguity before trading. It measures the ex ante
value to an uninformed agent of making future portfolio choices based on the true probability
distribution (as opposed to worst-case scenarios) when confronted with price information. This
value links to the uninformed ex ante evaluation of the welfare lossT (s;μ) implied by his portfolio
choice. Note that if T (s;μU) were zero in all states, then the value of parameter uncertainty would
be nil because the informed agents’ welfare is also appraised based on the worst-case scenario.
However, the next proposition establishes that this value is always positive:
Proposition 2. (Value of parameter uncertainty). Let μ>0. Then, the value of parameter
uncertainty in equation (4.6) is strictly positive. That is, information is more valuable in a market
with ambiguous fundamentals (μ>0) than in a market without ambiguity (μ=0).
One implication of Proposition 2 is that the amount of resources spent on collecting
information is higher in markets with ambiguity than in markets without, as formalized by
Corollary B.1 in Appendix B.
Which component of the value of information in equation (4.6) becomes most relevant as
more agents acquire information? It is an important issue, as the value of parameter uncertainty
can dwarf the familiar Grossman–Stiglitz effect and result in information complementarities: the
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higher the number of informed agents, the higher the incentives to acquire information. These
issues are analysed next.
5. INFORMATION ACQUISITION
5.1. Information revelation
What information does the asset price transmit to uninformed agents? How much information
does the price reveal as the number of informed agents increases? Regarding risk, Appendix B
(equation (B.6)) shows that the variance of the fundamental, conditional on price information, is
as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), namely
var( f |P(·)=p)≡ω f |s =ωε+(1−χ)ωθ , χ =
(
λ
ωτ
)2
ωθ(
λ
ωτ
)2
ωθ +ωz
. (5.1)
Regarding ambiguity conditional on price information,
Eμ¯ ( f |P(·)=p)−Eμ( f |P(·)=p)=(1−χ)μ≤μ≡Eμ¯ (f )−Eμ(f ), (5.2)
where the first equality follows from equations (A.2)–(A.3) in Appendix A. The L.H.S. of the
equality in equation (5.2) is the uncertainty remaining after an agent has observed the equilibrium
price. It is less than the unconditional ambiguity, μ. That is, price information helps reduce
ambiguity. Due to noisy supply (ωz >0), information revelation is partial. Furthermore, since the
parameter χ in equation (5.1) is increasing in λ, the model predicts that information acquisition
always leads to more informative prices, in terms of both risk and ambiguity. Despite the
latter intuitive property, the next section shows that due to ambiguity aversion, information
complementarities arise in this market.
5.2. Ambiguity aversion and information complementarities
The value of private information can be split into the benefit of reducing risk and the value of
parameter uncertainty (equation (4.6)). The latter is the value an uninformed agent would be
willing to pay ex ante for making future trading decisions based on the true distribution of the
fundamentals. This value increases as the price becomes more informative. In the following
examples, we provide intuition by comparing the welfare of an uninformed agent, UU (λ), to that
of a hypothetical uninformed agent who only faces risky choices at the trading stage, U¯U (λ), as
defined in Section 4.1.
Consider two polar cases in which either a few agents are informed or many are. To simplify
exposition, we assume that the asset is in positive supply. Define the equilibrium asset return per
share as the difference between the fundamentals f and the price P(s) given by equation (3.7),
R≡θ+−P(s(θ,z)). (5.3)
When there are no informed agents, the price does not incorporate information on the
ambiguous θ . Because an uninformed agent’s portfolio choice (xU in equation (3.3)) is only
a function of the price, there is no ambiguity regarding the choice he will make. That is, he
will face ambiguity at the trading stage, and evaluate the asset based on the worst-case scenario
μ∗(s)=μ; however, his actual portfolio choice will only depend on the realization of the asset
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supply (not θ ). Profits from trading, xU ·R, are ex ante ambiguous though. Indeed, the price is
uninformative and the expected returns are unknown, depending as they do on the unknown
mean of the fundamentals, Eμ(R)=μ−E(P). Anticipating holding the per-capita supply, the
ambiguity averse uninformed agent will then appraise the expected returns under the worst-case
scenario μU =μ.
What is the ex ante value of resolving ambiguity regarding μ in this case? On the one hand,
the agent would make portfolio decisions based on the true (not worst-case) expected return.
He would then benefit from an informational advantage that would grow with μ−μ≥0, the
difference between the true μ and the prior impounded into the price by the uninformed agents,
μ. On the other hand, the true μ is unknown when information decisions are made. Thus, the
agent’s ambiguity aversion makes him evaluate (ex ante) this advantage based on the worst-
case scenario μI =μ. That is, the informed agent anticipates making exactly the same portfolio
choice and profits as the uninformed agent. Resolving ambiguity regarding μ has no value in this
example. Formally, we have:
Lemma 1. In a market with no informed agents, i.e. where λ=0, there exists a μ¯z >0 such that
for all μz ≥ μ¯z, the ex ante prior of both the uninformed and the informed agents is μU =μI =μ.
In other words, when prices are not very informative, and the average supply μz is high
enough,6 the ex ante beliefs of the informed and the uninformed are the same. The beliefs coincide
with the uninformed worst-case scenario at the trading stage, μI =μU =μ∗(s)=μ, such that the
welfare loss T (s;μU )=0 in the most likely region of the state space. The value of parameter
uncertainty in equation (4.6) is small as a result.
As the number of informed agents increases, the price becomes more responsive to changes
in θ . Consider the limiting case in which everyone is informed, as in the example provided in
the Introduction. In this case, the price fully incorporates information on the fundamentals, such
that returns become unambiguous albeit still risky: P=θ−τωz, and R=+τωz. Returns are
independent of θ (and thus unambiguous). Yet, lacking knowledge of the distribution of θ , the
uninformed agent would now be exposed to ambiguous profits, xU ·R, through his own portfolio
choices, xU . How this happens is easily seen. Note that P still contains information about R.
Thus, while formulating his portfolio decision xU in equation (3.3), the uninformed agent forms
his prior-to-prior estimate of R given the price:
Eμ(R|p)=E(R)+ cov(R,p)
var(p)
(
p−Eμ(p)
)
. (5.4)
Equation (5.4) allows us to elaborate on the question raised in the Introduction: “How much of
a price change can be attributed to new information, and how much to a liquidity shock?” To give
a precise probabilistic answer, the true mean of p must be known. Lack of this knowledge leads
an uninformed agent to update his beliefs based on worst-case scenarios: the agent’s expectation
Eμ(p) in equation (5.4) is Eμ∗(s) (p), where μ∗(s)=μ when the agent is long the asset and
μ∗(s)= μ¯ when he is short. This makes the distribution of p−Eμ∗(s) (p) (and therefore the
6. When μz is high, there is a high probability that an uninformed agent will be long the asset, which matches the
intuition in these examples with positive asset supply. By contrast, because the asset supply is Gaussian in the model,
lower values of μz increase the probability of the event that the uninformed agents are short the asset. In this event, the
prior incorporated into the price is μ¯, such that the informed agent anticipates making a different portfolio choice than
the uninformed agent. The ensuing informational advantage is small (it is assessed at worst-case scenario) but positive. A
large μz facilitates our proofs, although it is not needed to generate complementarities, as we explain below (Figure 2).
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distribution of his own portfolio choice) dependent on μ, which is unknown at the time of making
the information decision.
How does the agent gauge the welfare implications of remaining uninformed? The agent’s
ambiguity aversion leads him to evaluate his future portfolio choice according to the worst-
case scenario, that is, as if his beliefs at the trading stage will be “unwarranted”. Precisely,
the uninformed ex ante beliefs are μU = μ¯ if the probability of being long (and, hence, that
μ∗(s)=μ at the trading stage) is sufficiently high; by contrast, the agent’s utility is independent
of μ if he becomes informed. The ensuing welfare loss, T (s;μU)>0, is what makes the
value of parameter uncertainty positive in equation (4.6). The following lemma summarizes
our conclusions regarding the agents’ ex ante beliefs in these informationally rich markets:
Lemma 2. There exists a μ¯z >0 and a level of information acquisition λ¯∈(0,1) depending on
μz, such that for all μz ≥ μ¯z, the ex ante prior of the uninformed agents is μU = μ¯ for all λ∈ (λ¯,1].
Moreover, for λ=1, the ex ante utility of the informed agents is independent of μ.
Lemmas 1 and 2 say that the prior of the uninformed agents’makes a switch from low (μU =μ)
to high (μU = μ¯) as markets become more informative. Thus, they suggest that the value of
parameter uncertainty increases from zero to positive as the number of informed agents increases.
Naturally, the fact that the value of parameter uncertainty increases with information acquisition
does not imply information complementarities. Complementarities arise once uncertainty is high
enough for this increase to dominate the Grossman–Stiglitz effect in equation (4.6):
Proposition 3. (Information complementarities). There exist a level of uncertainty μ>0 and
an average asset supply μ¯z >0, such that there are complementarities in information acquisition
for all μ>μ and μz >μ¯z.
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3. For the value of information to be higher
in λ=1 than in λ=0, μ needs to be large enough. However, progressively lower values of
μ are needed as μz increases. Indeed, a higher probability of being a buyer lowers the value of
parameter uncertainty when λ=0 and increases it when λ=1 as discussed previously.7 Therefore,
when μz is large, the increase in the value of parameter uncertainty dwarfs the Grossman–Stiglitz
effect even when μ is small.
The right panel of Figure 2 depicts the loci of μ and μz such that information
complementarities arise for any open interval of λ. The pattern and its rationale are the same
as in the left panel with two additional features. First, when μz is sufficiently large, information
complementarities are triggered by lower values of λ as μ increases, as will be further explained
in Section 5.4 (Figure 3). Secondly, complementarities arise also when the asset is in zero average
supply, μz =0, but for low values of λ.
The intuition behind the first feature is the same as that underlying the left panel of Figure
2. The value of parameter uncertainty is small when λ=0, but it increases even after a small
increase in λ, provided μ is high enough.
The intuition behind the second feature is as follows. When the average asset supply is small
or zero and λ is small, an uninformed agent has comparable odds of being either a buyer or a seller.
When the number of informed agents grows, an uninformed agent now faces a higher chance of
not participating at all, as explained in Section 3. The value of parameter uncertainty increases as a
result of foregone investment opportunities. Moreover, opportunities that are foregone due to not
7. See, e.g. Footnote 6.
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Figure 2
This figure depicts the loci of μ and μz leading to information complementarities. The shaded area in the left panel
contains the loci for which the value of information when all agents are informed is higher than that when all agents are
uninformed, that is (μ,μz) :G (c,1)>G (c,0). The shaded areas of the right panel depict the loci in markets with
varying levels of informational efficiency. The loci are such that the value of information in a given market exceeds that
in a slightly less informed market, that is (μ,μz) :G (c,λ)>G (c,λ−ε), with ε=0.05, and λ ranging from λ=0.05
(lightest area) to λ=1 (darkest). The remaining parameters are ωθ =ω =ωz =τ =1.
participating are high precisely when λ is low—expected profits flatten in a market with many
informed agents. Therefore, when μz is small, information complementarities result precisely
when there are few informed agents.
5.3. Value of price information
More information acquisition leads to more informative prices. We now address a further
issue: how valuable is the information that these prices contain? It is known that dynamic
inconsistency can lead to a negative value of information both in contexts without ambiguity (e.g.
Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000; and Eichberger et al., 2007) and with ambiguity (see, e.g. Siniscalchi
2011). Our focus is on information that is revealed in equilibrium. We show that, in our model,
the value of information accounted for by the price can turn negative when the value of parameter
uncertainty is high enough.
We denote by U0(λ) the ex ante utility of a hypothetical agent whose portfolio choice is
unconditional, in that it does not rely on price information:8
U0(λ)= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
(
−e−τx0R
)
, where x0 =argmax
x
(
min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
(
−e−τxR
))
. (5.5)
We define the value of price information as Gp(λ)≡− 1τ ln
(UU (λ)
U0(λ)
)
. It is the ex ante certainty
equivalent gain of forming portfolio choices based on price information relative to making
8. Interestingly, x0 can also be interpreted as the portfolio chosen by an uninformed agent in a pre-commitment
equilibrium when λ=1, provided uncertainty μ is high enough (Section 6.2).
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unconditional portfolio choices. Note that the value of price information and that of parameter
uncertainty in equation (4.6) add up to the value of price information for an agent who only faces
risky choices at the trading stage, that is,
Gp(λ)= −1
τ
ln
(
U¯U (λ)
U0(λ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of price information for interim risky trades
−
[
−1
τ
ln
(
U¯U (λ)
UU (λ)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of parameter uncertainty
, (5.6)
where U¯U (λ) is the ex ante utility in equation (4.2).
In Appendix C, we solve for the unconditional portfolio choice in equation (5.5) (see
Proposition C.1). We also show that, in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model, the value of
price information simply reflects the reduction of risk, thus always being positive, that is
Ggsp (λ)≡ Gp(λ)
∣∣
μ=0 =
1
2τ
ln
(
Var(R)
Var(R|p)
)
. (5.7)
When is the value of price information negative in our model? Intuitively, equation (5.6)
suggests that Gp(λ) is negative when the value of parameter uncertainty is high enough. Now,
as the number of informed agents increases, the asset returns become risky only, not ambiguous,
such that the first term on the R.H.S. of equation (5.6) approaches Ggsp (·). Therefore, when λ is
high, not only is the value of price information lower than in Grossman–Stiglitz, but it can in fact
be negative, provided the value of parameter uncertainty is high enough. The next proposition
shows that, for large μz, this is the case when uncertainty μ is high enough:
Proposition 4. (Negative value of price information). There exist a level of uncertainty μ>0
and an average asset supply μ¯z >0, and a given fraction of informed agents λ¯∈(0,1), such that
the value of price information is negative for all μ>μ, μz >μ¯z, and λ∈ (λ¯,1].
5.4. Multiple equilibria and the impact of an uncertainty shock
Information complementarities can lead to multiple equilibria when information decisions are
discrete choices, as in our model.9 Figure 3 illustrates instances of the value of information,G (c,λ)
from equation (4.6), plotted as a function of the fraction of informed agents, λ, and obtained with
four degrees of ambiguity, μ.
The lower, solid and thin line is the value of information in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
model, that is, when μ=0.As we increase μ from the benchmark value of 0 to 1, then 1.50 and
finally 2, G (c,λ) increases progressively, which is consistent with Proposition 2. When μ=1,
there is a unique interior, and stable, equilibrium, where the fraction of informed agents is higher
than in the benchmark case. As μ increases to 1.50, the market displays two interior equilibria:
the leftmost and stable equilibrium (λ∗=λS), and the rightmost and unstable equilibrium (λ∗=
λU ).10 Note that, when μ=1.50, there is a third and stable equilibrium: λ∗=1. The kink in
9. See Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Myatt and Wallace (2012) for results regarding information comple-
mentarities and multiple equilibria under different information structures.
10. The rightmost equilibrium is unstable in that (i) for all λ∈(λS,λU ), the informed agents would be better off
once uninformed, and (ii) for all λ∈(λU ,1], it would be in the interest of the uninformed agents to acquire information.
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Figure 3
This figure depicts the value of information, G (c,λ), as a function of the fraction of informed agents, λ, for a given cost
of information, c. The uppermost, solid and thick line is the value of information obtained with μ=2. The two dashed
lines below it depict the value of information when μ=1.50 and μ=1.00. The lower, solid and thin line depicts the
value of information in the benchmark case with no ambiguity, that is, when μ=0. The remaining parameter values
are ωθ =ω =ωz =τ =1, μz =2, and c=0.3.
the value of information arises as the prior of the uninformed agents’ shifts from μ to μ¯ as λ
increases, as explained in Section 5.2 (Lemmas 1 and 2).11
As μ increases in Figure 3, the value of information increases for each λ, and shifts the
stable (interior) equilibria to the right, and the unstable one to the left. When μ is sufficiently
high, there remains one equilibrium only, at λ∗=1. The uppermost, thick line, which corresponds
to μ=2, depicts an example of such a situation.
The right panel of Figure 4 depicts the unconditional expectation of the price as a function of
μ, when the proportion of agents who acquire information is determined endogenously as in
the left panel. When μ is small, an increase in μ leads to a positive but modest increase in
λ, and hence a lower average price, reflecting less aggressive trading of the uninformed agents.
As μ becomes sufficiently large, the market shifts to its “information frenzy” regime, in which
all agents become informed. The average price jumps up as a result, and then remains flat as μ
increases further.
Therefore, the model predicts a non-monotonic relation between the degree of Knightian
uncertainty and the average asset return. When uncertainty is low, the price falls, on average,
following a series of positive changes in μ—a sequence of “uncertainty shocks”. When
uncertainty is sufficiently high, the price rebounds as a result of information acquisition. It jumps
back to the equilibrium in the lower branch of Figure 4 when uncertainty becomes sufficiently low.
Furthermore, the price exhibits path dependence and different jump sizes, according to whether
11. While these shifts in the prior are relevant to information complementarities in the context of the maxmin model
of this section, they do not not appear in the smooth ambiguity extension of the model (Section 6.3), in which ambiguity
aversion operates through the agents’ aversion to mean-preserving spreads in expected utility values.
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Figure 4
The left panel depicts the proportion of informed agents in the stable equilibria, λ, as a function of the ambiguity size,
μ. The right panel is the unconditional expectation of the equilibrium price corresponding to each λ in the left panel.
The parameter values are ωθ =ω =ωz =τ =1, μz =2, and c=0.3.
uncertainty is increasing or decreasing. For all μ belonging to the area delimited by the two
arrows, the average price is in the lower branch conditional on a history of positive uncertainty
shocks, and in the upper branch otherwise.
Note, then, the model’s prediction regarding asset price volatility. After the market has
undergone an information frenzy and a highly volatile rally, the equilibrium price is, on average,
in the upper branch of Figure 4. In this regime, the asset price is insensitive to further uncertainty
shocks (both positive and negative) and is, on average, higher than in the lower branch’s regime.
Once uncertainty resettles to sufficiently low levels, the market experiences subsequent longer
term “reversals”, with the price undergoing the low information regime of the lower branch of
Figure 4.
6. EXTENSIONS
This section considers three extensions, aiming to analyse departures from some of the model
assumptions made so far.
The first extension is learning. Full Bayesian updating is not the only learning mechanism
available while dealing with ambiguity. In Section 6.1, we consider a different rule from the
prior-by-prior updates of the previous sections, and discusses additional alternatives.
The second extension is commitment. The uninformed agents would be better off were they
able to pre-commit to state-contingent portfolio decisions at the trading stage, as discussed in
Section 4.2. In Section 6.2, we consider a model with pre-commitment.
The third extension is the separation of tastes and beliefs. Maxmin preferences do not allow
us to disentangle the cognitive notion of ambiguity from the attitude towards it, as mentioned in
Section 3.2. In Section 6.3, we adopt the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, et al. (2005),
which enables us to implement comparative statics of changing ambiguity or ambiguity aversion.
6.1. Maximum likelihood updates of prior beliefs
With full Bayesian updating, no learning occurs regarding the original set of priors, which means
that the uninformed agents retain all their initial priors. The set of posterior beliefs on θ given
the price is the set of prior beliefs on θ , with each prior updated according to Bayes’ rule. This
section considers an updating rule based on the maximum likelihood principle, whereby the
uninformed agents do not necessarily retain all of their initial priors after observing the price.
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Maximum likelihood updating was axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). It captures
the main flavour of classical statistical inference, as further discussed by Gilboa and Marinacci
(2013).
The literature contains alternative learning approaches to those we consider in this article.
A popular approach is set out by Epstein and Schneider (2003), who consider a discrete-time
extension of the multiple priors model that is recursive and, hence, dynamically consistent.
(2007, 2008) are examples of learning models within this context, in which agents have theories
of multiple likelihoods that link signals to true parameters. Likewise, Hanany and Klibanoff
(2007, 2009) retain dynamic consistency by allowing the update rule to depend not only on
new information, but also on prior choices, in the spirit of early work by Machina (1989).
In contrast, while distinct from full Bayesian updating, our analysis of this extension still
considers uninformed agents who deal with preference conflicts at different decision nodes
through consistent planning.12
While updating their beliefs through maximum likelihood, the uninformed agents retain those
priors within their initial set that assign the highest probability to the occurrence of the observed
events. That is, conditional on the observed equilibrium price having taken a value of p, the set
of retained priors is
Mp ≡
{
μ∈[μ,μ¯]
∣∣∣μ∈argmaxμ∈[μ,μ¯]Prob(P(·)=p)}. (6.1)
The retained priors are then updated according to Bayes’ rule.
We solve the model in Online Appendix D available as Supplementary Material, where we
extend the analysis of the previous sections to this new setting. In particular, we show that the
equilibrium price is piecewise linear in the compound signal (Proposition D.1), that the value
of information is strictly higher than in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) benchmark without
ambiguity (Proposition D.2), and that information complementarities arise when uncertainty is
high enough (Proposition D.3).
6.2. Equilibrium with pre-commitment
In our model, uninformed agents would be better off were they able to pre-commit to portfolio
policies (Section 4.2). Moreover, the value of price information can be negative when enough
agents acquire information (Section 5.3). A natural question then arises as to whether our
conclusions on the value of information and learning complementarities are specific to the
assumption of consistent planning. In this section, we analyse a market in which uninformed
agents do pre-commit to a contingent portfolio choice p 	→xU (p), in equilibrium. (The possibility
of pre-committing is not relevant to the informed agents, as shown in Online Appendix E
available as Supplementary Material.) The model, solved in Online Appendix E available as
Supplementary Material, leads to two main conclusions.
First, in the equilibrium with pre-commitment, the value of information is represented as in
equation (4.6), with a positive value of parameter uncertainty. This value is strictly positive, unless
two conditions hold simultaneously: namely, that the uninformed agents (i) optimally pre-commit
to a linear portfolio policy,
xU (p)= Eμ
∗ ( f |p)−p
τVar( f |p) , for some constant μ
∗ ∈[μ,μ¯], (6.2)
12. For example, see equation (D.15) in Online Appendix D available as Supplementary Material for an expression
of the welfare loss that arises in this version of the model, corresponding to T (s;μ) in equation (4.5).
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and (ii) gauge their ex ante utility at the very same μ∗. This is a fixed point problem: the prior
μˆ minimizing ex ante utility depends on μ∗, and at the same time has to be equal to μ∗ in
equation (6.2) (Lemma E.2). Proposition E.1 shows that there exists a threshold μ∗, determined
in closed form (see equation (E9)), such that a fixed point exists if and only if μ≤μ∗. The
threshold goes to zero as λ→1: the value of parameter uncertainty is always strictly positive
when sufficiently many agents are informed.
Secondly, information complementarities may also arise in an equilibrium in which
uninformed agents are bound to pre-commit to linear strategies. We provide conditions such
that the value of information in the λ=1 case exceeds that in λ=0 case, conditions that link
to the unconditional portfolio problem in Section 5.3. When λ=1, an agent who remained
uninformed would pre-commit to a portfolio policy xU (p), which becomes less and less sensitive
to the equilibrium price p as μ increases, flattening out to the unconditional portfolio choice
in equation (5.5) in the limit when μ is large (Lemma E.5). That is, by pre-committing, the
uninformed agents mitigate concerns due to the uncertainty regarding the information contained
by the price. However, by pre-committing, the uninformed agents also face much higher risk,
precisely due to their policy now being unresponsive to p. Under conditions given by Proposition
E.2, the value of information is higher in the case where λ=1 than when λ=0, reflecting the
much higher risk to which the uninformed agents are exposed under higher levels of λ.
6.3. Smooth ambiguity aversion
Maxmin preferences do not allow us to disentangle ambiguity from ambiguity aversion. We now
assume that agents display smooth ambiguity preferences, as in Klibanoff, et al. (2005) (KMM,
hereafter). Given a set of priors Q over μ, a utility function U, and an increasing and concave
function h :R→R, a KMM decision maker prefers act x′ to act x if and only if
EQ[h(Eμ(U(Wx′ )))]≥EQ
[
h
(
Eμ
(
U(Wx)))], (6.3)
where U (Wx) denotes the utility of wealth Wx drawn from act x—a portfolio choice, in our
context. Concavity of h means that a decision maker dislikes mean-preserving spreads in expected
utility values, such that he may be defined as ambiguity averse. Only if h is linear will the
decision maker be ambiguity neutral. One example of the function h in equation (6.3) is h(u)=
− 1σ
(
e−σu−1), where the parameter σ is a measure of absolute ambiguity aversion. If σ =0, the
model collapses to a description of a Bayesian decision maker. Maxmin expected utility obtains
under the assumption that σ is large (see Proposition 3 in KMM).
We assume that the prior μ∼N (μ0,ωμ), and that the function h in equation (6.3) exhibits
constant relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA), that is, h(u)=−(−u)α , for some constant α≥1.
In this setup, ωμ summarizes the extent of parameter uncertainty about μ, and α is a measure
of ambiguity aversion, with the decision maker being Bayesian if α=1, and ambiguity averse if
α>1. The model is solved in Online Appendix F available as Supplementary Material. Its main
predictions are that the value of information is higher in a market with uncertainty than in one
without, and that there are complementarities in information acquisition, multiple equilibria, and
possibly a negative value of price information—just as in the maxmin case.
By disentangling parameter uncertainty from aversion to it, the model allows us to single out
the effect of ambiguity aversion on the value of parameter uncertainty. In Online Appendix F
available as Supplementary Material, we establish that, if agents are Bayesian, that is, if α=1,
the value of parameter uncertainty is strictly positive (Lemma F.1), but it also decreases with
information acquisition (Proposition F.1), such that information choices can only be strategic
substitutes. Furthermore, we show that information complementarities and multiple equilibria
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Figure 5
This figure depicts the unconditional expectation of the equilibrium price corresponding to the endogenous fraction of
informed agents, λ∗, as a function of the uncertainty size, ωμ, for two values of the ambiguity aversion parameter, α.
The left panel sets α=2.5 and the right panel sets α=6. Other parameter values are ωθ =ω =ωz =τ =1, μz =4,
μ0 =10, and c=0.6.
(Proposition F.1), and a negative value of price information (Proposition F.2), arise only if agents
are ambiguity averse, that is, if α>1. Note that these properties arise even if, unlike in the
maxmin model of Sections 3–5, portfolio and information choices are not based on the worst-
case scenario.13 They do arise, however, through the same mechanism as that in the maxmin
model—the value of parameter uncertainty increases with information acquisition.
Figure 5 depicts the comparative statics regarding the market behaviour after a change in the
uncertainty aversion parameter, α. Each panel is the counterpart to the right panel in Figure 4,
and plots the average price against the uncertainty size, ωμ, when the fraction of informed
agents is endogenous. Similarly as in the maxmin model, the price decreases with uncertainty,
on average, reflecting less aggressive trading by the uninformed agents. Once ωμ is sufficiently
large, information complementarities are triggered, with an “information frenzy” that leads to a
discontinuity in the average equilibrium price and then to a positive “price drift”, determined by
further information acquisition that occurs in a smooth fashion.
An increase in ambiguity aversion has clear implications in this market: (i) it increases the
price impact of changes in uncertainty, ωμ, (ii) it reduces the critical value of ωμ that triggers
learning complementarities, and (iii) it leads to wider price swings. The higher price impact in (i),
and the ensuing properties (ii) and (iii), are consistent with the intuition that increased ambiguity
aversion leads to less aggressive asset demand. Gollier (2011) shows that this intuitive property
of asset demand might not be robust to alternative specifications of h in equation (6.3), which go
beyond the CRAA case of this section.
7. CONCLUSION
This article departs from the literature in its focus on the value of information in markets with
Knightian uncertainty. How valuable is it to acquire information that other investors already
have? In their seminal work, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, p. 405) conclude that “… there is
a fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information and the
incentives to acquire information”. In markets with Knightian uncertainty, this conflict takes a
novel form.
13. For instance, and regarding the formulation of portfolio choices, see equation (F.4).
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In our model, more information acquisition implies that prices have more information content:
as the number of informed investors grows, those who remain uninformed trade with less risk
and less ambiguity. The incentives to reduce risk by acquiring information thus diminish with
information acquisition, just as in Grossman and Stiglitz, but the incentives to reduce ambiguity
do not. The benefit of reducing ambiguity is to allow an ambiguity averse agent to correctly
interpret the information revealed by the asset prices (the “value of parameter uncertainty”).
Because asset prices become increasingly informative as more investors acquire information, the
value of parameter uncertainty increases with information acquisition.
When uncertainty is high enough, these ambiguity effects overwhelm those arising from risk.
Information acquisition decisions become strategic complements: the more investors acquire
information, the higher are the incentives to become informed. These markets then respond
to even small changes in uncertainty with episodes of large price fluctuations, driven by hasty
changes in information demand. Our model suggests that investors’fear of dealing with Knightian
uncertainty can lead to new information-based explanations of asset market volatility.
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS FOR SECTION 3
Proof of Proposition 1. By the market-clearing condition, equation (3.6), the equilibrium price arising when the
uninformed agents do not participate is:
P(s)=− τω
λ
μz + τω
λ
s,
which is the second line in equation (3.7). Next, we compute the uninformed agents’ expectation of the asset payoff, in the
states of nature where these agents participate. Denote the conditional expectation μ f |s (s;μ)≡Eμ( f |S=s). We have,
μ f |s (s;μ)=(1−χ)μ+
(
λ
τω
)−1
χs, χ ≡
(
λ
τω
)2
ωθ(
λ
τω
)2
ωθ +ωz
. (A.1)
Using equation (A.1), and ωs =
(
λ
ωτ
)2
ωθ +ωz , straightforward computations leave:
Ebuy ( f |S=s)= τ
2ω2ωz
λ2ωθ +τ 2ω2ωz
μ+ λτωωθ
λ2ωθ +τ 2ω2ωz
s (A.2)
Esell ( f |S=s)= τ
2ω2ωz
λ2ωθ +τ 2ω2ωz
μ¯+ λτωωθ
λ2ωθ +τ 2ω2ωz
s (A.3)
Next, we plug equations (A.2)–(A.3) into the demand schedule, equation (3.3), replace the result into the market-clearing
condition, equation (3.6), conjecture the piece-wise linear price function in equation (3.7), and solve for undetermined
coefficients, obtaining,
a =
−λ2μzτωωθ +
(
μ(1−λ)ω −μzτω (ω +ωθ )
)
τ 2ωzω
λ2ωθ +λτ 2ωθωzω +τ 2ωzω2
a¯ = a+ μ(1−λ)τ
2ωzω
2

λ2ωθ +λτ 2ωθωzω +τ 2ωzω2
a = − τω
λ
μz
b =
(
λωθ +ωzτ 2ω (ωθ +ω)
)
τω
λ2ωθ +λτ 2ωθωzω +τ 2ωzω2
Finally, we determine the threshold for the compound signal, s and s¯. We use the cut-off conditions in equation (3.4).
As for s, consider the first equation, Ebuy
(
f |P(·,·)=p
)
=p. For s≤s, the conjectured price function is linear in s.
Therefore, we solve for p by equivalently solving for s in the following condition,
Ebuy
( f |S=s)=p=a+bs,
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where Ebuy
( f |S=s) is given by equation (A.2), and the second equality holds by the first line of the conjectured price
function in equation (3.7). We do the same to determine s¯, by solving,
Esell ( f |S= s¯)= p¯= a¯+bs¯,
where Esell ( f |S= s¯) is given by equation (A.3). The expressions for s and s¯ given in Proposition 1 then follow by simple
computations. Finally, we calculate the threshold prices p¯ and p. We plug equations (A.2)–(A.3) into equation (3.4), use
the price function in equation (3.7), and obtain p=μ+ λωθ
τωωz
μz and p¯= μ¯+ λωθτωωz μz , which confirm that p< p¯. 
B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 4
B.1. Derivation of the ex ante utilities
B.1.1. Informed agents. Let μθ |s (s;μ) and ω θ |s denote the conditional expectation and variance of θ given s,
Eμ( θ |s)=μθ |s (s;μ)=μ f |s (s;μ), ω θ |s = ωzωθ
ωs
, (B.1)
where μ f |s (s;μ) is as in equation (A.1). We have,
Eμ
[
−e−τWˆI
]
=Eμ
[
E
(
−e−τWˆI
∣∣∣θ,s)]=Eμ[e−τ(C(θ,s)−c)], (B.2)
where WˆI is the informed agent’s wealth,
C(θ,s)≡ 1
2
(θ−P(s))2
τω
is the certainty equivalent for the expected utility of the informed agent at the trading stage and, finally, P(s) is the
equilibrium price of Proposition 1. By conditioning upon the signal s in equation (B.2),
Eμ
[
−e−τWˆI
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Eμ
(
−e−τ(C(θ,σ )−c)
∣∣∣σ)d(σ ;ms (μ),ωs), (B.3)
where (·;m,ω) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a normal variable with mean m and variance ω, and
ms (μ) and ωs denote the mean and variance of the compound signal s in equation (3.5), with
ms (μ)≡Eμ(s)= λ
τω
μ, (B.4)
and:
Eμ
(
−e−τ(C(θ,σ )−c)
∣∣∣σ)=eτc∫ ∞
−∞
(
−e−τC(θ,σ )
)
d(θ;μθ |s (σ ;μ),ω θ |s)=−eτc
√
ω
ω f |s
e−τ C¯(σ ;μ) (B.5)
where
C¯(s;μ)= 1
2
(
Eμ( θ |s)−P(s)
)2
τω f |s
,
and
ω f |s =ω + ωzωθ
ωs
. (B.6)
By replacing P(s) and the expression forμθ |s (s;μ) in equation (B.1) into the expression for C¯(s;μ) leaves, for sˆ= 12
(
s+ s¯),
e−τ C¯(s;μ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
exp
⎛
⎝−1
2
δ2
ω f |s
(
s−s− δˆ
δ
λ
τω
(
μ−μ
))2⎞⎠, for s<s
exp
(
−1
2
δˆ2
ω f |s
(
s− sˆ− λ
τω
μ
)2)
, for s∈ [s,s¯]
exp
⎛
⎝−1
2
δ2
ω f |s
(
s− s¯+ δˆ
δ
λ
τω
(μ¯−μ)
)2⎞⎠, for s> s¯
(B.7)
where
δ= τ
3ωzω3
(
λ2ωθ +τ 2ωzω2 +τ 2ωzωθω
)(
λ2ωθ +λτ 2ωzωθω +τ 2ωzω2
)(
λ2ωθ +τ 2ωzω2
) , δˆ= τωωz
λωs
. (B.8)
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Finally, substituting equations (B.5) and (B.7) into equation (B.3), and integrating, leaves the following closed-form
expression for the expectation in equation (4.1) of the main text,
Eμ
[
−e−τ(C(θ,σ )−c)
]
=eτc
√
ω
ω f |s
·
∑
∈{buy,np,sell}
Iμ, (B.9)
where, denoting (·)≡(·;0,1),
Ibuyμ =−κ exp
⎛
⎜⎝− δ2
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ0
(
μ−μ
))2
2
(
ω f |s +δ2ωs
)
⎞
⎟⎠( κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz −γ1
(
μ−μ
)))
Inpμ =−κˆ exp
(
−
δˆ2( ωs
ωz
μz)2
2(ω f |s + δˆ2ωs)
)
×
[

(
κˆ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ2 (μ¯−μ)
))
−
(
κˆ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz −γ2
(
μ−μ
)))]
Isellμ =−κ exp
⎛
⎜⎝− δ2
(
ωs
ωz
μz −γ0 (μ¯−μ)
)2
2
(
ω f |s +δ2ωs
)
⎞
⎟⎠[1−( κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ1 (μ¯−μ)
))]
and:
κ =
√
ω f |s
ω f |s +δ2ωs , κˆ =
√
ω f |s
ω f |s + δˆ2ωs
,
γ0 =
(
δˆ
δ
−1
)
λ
τω
, γ1 =
(
1+δ δˆωs
ω f |s
)
λ
τω
, γ2 =
(
1+ δˆ δˆωs
ω f |s
)
λ
τω
. 
B.1.2. Uninformed agents. We derive the expression for T in equation (4.5), and a closed-form expression for
the expectation in the second equality of equation (4.4). We have:
Eμ
[
−e−τWˆU
∣∣∣s]=Eμ[−e−τxU (s)(f −P(s))∣∣∣s]
=−exp
(
−τxU (s)
(
μ f |s (s;μ)−P(s)
)+ τ 2
2
x2U (s)ω f |s
)
, (B.10)
where WˆU is the uninformed agent’s wealth,
xU (s)= μ f |s (s;μ
∗ (s))−P(s)
τω f |s
,
and μ∗ (s) is defined as in second of equation (4.3) in the main text. Replacing the previous expression for xU (s) into
equation (B.10) leads to the second equality of equations (4.4), where:
T (s;μ)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
μ−μ
)2
(1−χ )2
2τω f |s
, for s<s
C¯(s;μ), for s∈ [s,s¯]
(μ¯−μ)2 (1−χ )2
2τω f |s
, for s> s¯
(B.11)
and χ is defined as in equation (A.1). Finally, we use equations (B.7) and (B.11) to determine the expectation in the
ex ante utility for the uninformed in equations (4.4),
Eμ
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μ)−T (s;μ))]= ∑
∈{buy,np,sell}
Jμ, (B.12)
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where
Jbuyμ = exp
⎛
⎜⎝
(
μ−μ
)2
(1−χ)2
2ω f |s
⎞
⎟⎠·Ibuyμ ,
Jnpμ = −
[

(
s¯−ms (μ)√
ωs
)
−
(
s−ms (μ)√
ωs
)]
,
Jsellμ = exp
(
(μ¯−μ)2 (1−χ)2
2ω f |s
)
·Isellμ ,
and Ibuyμ and Isellμ are the same as in equation (B.9). 
B.2. State contingent plans dominating consistent planning
We show that xU (s)≡xU (p,P(θ,z)) in equation (3.3) is dominated by alternative portfolio policies, in that the latter
deliver a higher ex ante utility than UU (λ) in equation (4.4). We aim to tilt xU (·) by a function such that the resulting
tilted asset demand schedule generates a higher ex ante utility.
Consider the following alternative contingent portfolio rule,
xˆ(s,t)= μ f |s (s;μ
∗(s)+th(s))−P(s)
τω f |s
, (B.13)
where μ f |s (s;μ) is defined as in equation (A.1), t ≥0 and h(s) is any continuous function such that: (i) h(s)≥0 for s≤s,
(ii) h(s)=0 for s∈[s,s¯], and (iii) h(s)≤0 for s≥s, with h(s) being strictly different from zero on some open set for both
s≤s and s≥ s¯. Note that by construction,
xU (s)= xˆ(s,0) for all s. (B.14)
Denote with Uˆ (t) the ex ante utility corresponding to xˆ(·,t). Define
f (μ,t)=Eμ
⎡
⎣−e− (μ f |s(s;μ)−P(s))
2
2ω f |s +
(μ∗(s)+th(s)−μ)2(1−χ )2
2ω f |s
⎤
⎦.
Using the definition of μ∗ (·) in equation (4.3), and that of h(·), we obtain:
∂f (μ,t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
∫ s
−∞
e
− (μ f |s(s;μ)−P(s))
2
2ω f |s +
(
μ−μ
)2(1−χ )2
2ω f |s
((
μ−μ
)
(1−χ )2
ω f |s h(s)
)
φ
(
s; λ
τω
μ,ωs
)
ds
+
∫ ∞
s¯
e
− (μ f |s(s;μ)−P(s))
2
2ω f |s +
(μ−μ¯)2(1−χ )2
2ω f |s
(
(μ−μ¯)(1−χ )2
ω f |s h(s)
)
φ
(
s; λ
τω
μ,ωs
)
ds,
where φ denotes the normal density, d≡φds. Given that μ−μ≥0 and and h(s)≥0 for s≤s, with the inequality being
strict on some open set, the first term is strictly positive for all μ>μ and zero for μ=μ. Given that μ−μ¯≤0 and h(s)≤0
for s≥ s¯, with the inequality being strict on some open set, the second term is strictly positive for all μ<μ¯ and zero
for μ= μ¯. Therefore, ∂f (μ,t)
∂t
∣∣∣
t=0 >0 for all μ, which implies that there exist sufficiently small values of t >0 such that
f (μ,t)> f (μ,0) for all μ, and, then, Uˆ (t)=minμ∈[μ,μ¯] f (μ,t)>minμ∈[μ,μ¯] f (μ,0). But by equation (B.14), Uˆ (0)=UU .
It follows that for t small enough, Uˆ (t)>UU . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the definition of the value of information for any λ in equation (4.6). We wish to show
that for μ>0,
EμU
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μU )−T (s;μU ))]
EμI
[
−e−τ C¯(s;μI )
] >1.
Because EμI [−e−τ C¯(s;μI )] and EμU [−e−τ
(C¯(s;μU )−T (s;μU ))] are both strictly negative, the previous inequality holds true
if:
EμI
[
−e−τ C¯(s;μI )
]
>EμU
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μU )−T (s;μU ))], (B.15)
where we define, as in the main text:
μI ∈arg min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τ C¯(s;μ)
]
, μU ∈arg min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μ)−T (s;μ))].
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To show that the inequality (B.15) is true, suppose the contrary, i.e. that:
EμI
[
−e−τ C¯(s;μI )
]
≤EμU
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μU )−T (s;μU ))]. (B.16)
Because T (s;μ) is non-negative and strictly positive on an open set of values of s (equation (B.11)), we have that,
EμI
[
−e−τ C¯(s;μI )
]
>EμI
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μI )−T (s;μI ))]. (B.17)
Combining (B.16) with (B.17) yields,
EμI
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μI )−T (s;μI ))]<EμI [−e−τ C¯(s;μI )]≤EμU [−e−τ(C¯(s;μU )−T (s;μU ))],
contradicting that μU minimizes Eμ
[
−e−τ
(C¯(s;μ)−T (s;μ))]
. 
The next corollary follows directly by Proposition 2:
Corollary B.1. Information is purchased by more agents in the presence of ambiguity than in markets without ambiguity,
and strictly so unless the equilibrium fraction of informed agents in both markets is either zero or one.
Proof. Let λ∗(μ)∈ (0,1] solve the indifference condition, G (c,λ)=0. Assume now that λ∗(0)≥λ∗(μ), for some
μ>0. By Proposition 2 and the fact that the first term in the R.H.S. of equation (4.6) is decreasing in λ, this cannot be
the case as we would have, G (c,λ∗(μ))>0. Furthermore, since G (c,λ)|μ>0 > G (c,λ)|μ=0 for all λ by Proposition 2,
then λ∗(μ)=0 implies λ∗(0)=0, and λ∗(0)=1 implies λ∗(μ)=1. 
C. PROOFS FOR SECTION 5
We prove Proposition 3 by relying on Lemmas 1 and 2 in the main text. We prove these two lemmas first.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show that for λ=0, there exists a μˆz >0, such that for all μz ≥ μˆz , the ex ante utility of the
informed agents occurs at μ=μ, i.e. UI (c,0)=Eμ[−e−τWˆI ]. Note that because Inpμ =0 when λ=0, it is sufficient to show
that for all μz ≥ μˆz, argminμ∈[μ,μ¯]
(
Ibuyμ +Isellμ
)
=μ. When λ=0, by equation (B.9) we have,
Ibuyμ =−c0 exp
⎛
⎜⎝− c202
(
τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
))2
ωf
⎞
⎟⎠( c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
(C.1)
Isellμ =−c0 exp
(
− c
2
0
2
(
τωf μz −(μ¯−μ)
)2
ωf
)[
1−
(
c0√
ωz
(μz +τωz (μ¯−μ))
)]
(C.2)
where ωf =ωθ +ω , and c0 =
(
1+τ 2ωf ωz
)− 12
.
We show that μ 	→
(
Ibuyμ +Isellμ
)
is increasing when μz is sufficiently large. We have,
c−10
∂
∂μ
Ibuyμ =e
− c
2
0
2
(
τωf μz+(μ−μ)
)2
ωf
⎛
⎝c20 τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
)
ωf
⎞
⎠( c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
+e−
c20
2
(
τωf μz+(μ−μ)
)2
ωf φ
(
c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
c0τ
√
ωz, (C.3)
and,
c−10
∂
∂μ
Isellμ =e
− c
2
0
2
(
τωf μz−(μ¯−μ)
)2
ωf c20
τωf μz −(μ¯−μ)
ωf
[
1−
(
c0 (μz +τωz (μ¯−μ))√
ωz
)]
−e−
c20
2
(
τωf μz−(μ¯−μ)
)2
ωf φ
(
c0√
ωz
(μz +τωz (μ¯−μ))
)
c0τ
√
ωz
≡Bsell1 +Bsell2 . (C.4)
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The term Bsell1 is strictly positive for all μ whenever μz >μ
∗
z ≡ μτωf . After tedious but straightforward computations, we
find that
c−10
∂
∂μ
Ibuyμ +Bsell2 =exp
⎛
⎜⎝− c202
(
τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
))2
ωf
⎞
⎟⎠·(H1 (μ)+H2 (μ)),
where,
H1 (μ)≡
⎛
⎝c20 τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
)
ωf
⎞
⎠( c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
H2 (μ)≡φ
(
c0√
ωz
(μz +τωz (μ¯−μ))
)
exp
(
c20
(
μzτ −μτ 2ωz
)
μ
)
×
[
1−exp
(
c20μ
(
1+τ 2ωzωf
)
ωf
μ
)]
c0τ
√
ωz.
The function H1 (μ) is clearly positive for all μ whenever μz >μ∗z . The function H2 (μ) is zero for μ=0, positive
for μ<0, and negative for μ>0. Therefore, the function H (μ)≡H1 (μ)+H2 (μ) is positive for all μ≤0. If, instead,
μ>0, we have, clearly, that minμ∈(0,μ¯] H2 (μ)=H2 (μ∗)≡ H¯2 >−∞, for some μ∗ ∈(0,μ¯] and limμz→∞H2 (μ)=0 for
all μ∈[μ,μ¯]. Moreover, for each μ, the function H1 (μ) is increasing in μz , with limμz→∞H1 (μ)=∞. Therefore, for
each μ>0, there exists a finite μˆz , such that H (μ)≥H1 (μ)+H¯2 >0 for all μz ≥ μˆz . Take μ˜z =max
{
μ∗z ,μˆz
}
to conclude
about the informed agents’ choice.
Next, we show that for λ=0, there exists a μˇz >0, such that for all μz ≥ μˇz , the ex ante utility of the uninformed
agents also occurs at μ=μ, i.e. UU (0)=Eμ[−e−τWˆU ]. When λ=0, we have, by equation (B.12), that,
Jbuyμ +Jsellμ =exp
⎛
⎜⎝
(
μ−μ
)2
2ωf
⎞
⎟⎠·Ibuyμ +exp
(
(μ¯−μ)2
2ωf
)
·Isellμ ,
where Ibuyμ and Isellμ are as in equations (C.2)–(C.3). We need to show that A1 +A2 >0 for all μ, where,
A1 ≡c−10
∂
∂μ
⎛
⎜⎝exp
⎛
⎜⎝
(
μ−μ
)2
2ωf
⎞
⎟⎠·Ibuyμ
⎞
⎟⎠=e (μ−μ)
2
2ωf ·
(
μ−μ
ωf
(
−c−10 Ibuyμ
)
+c−10
∂
∂μ
Ibuyμ
)
,
and,
A2 ≡c−10
∂
∂μ
(
exp
(
(μ¯−μ)2
2ωf
)
·Isellμ
)
=e
(μ¯−μ)2
2ωf ·
(
μ¯−μ
ωf
(
−c−10 Isellμ
)
+c−10
∂
∂μ
Isellμ
)
,
and the terms, ∂
∂μ
Ibuyμ and ∂∂μ I
sell
μ , are as in equations (C.3)–(C.4). By equations (C.1) and (C.3),
μ−μ
ωf
(
−c−10 Ibuyμ
)
+c−10
∂
∂μ
Ibuyμ
=
⎛
⎝c20 τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
)
ωf
− μ−μ
ωf
⎞
⎠exp
⎛
⎜⎝− c202
(
τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
))2
ωf
⎞
⎟⎠( c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
+exp
⎛
⎜⎝− c202
(
τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
))2
ωf
⎞
⎟⎠φ( c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
c0τ
√
ωz
≡ A11 +A12,
such that A11 >0 for all μ whenever μz >μ∗∗z ≡ μc20τωf (1−c
2
0)=μτωz . Next, we show that for μz large enough, A3 ≡
exp
((
μ−μ
)2
2ωf
)
A12 +A2 >0, for all μ, thereby completing the proof. We use equations (C.2) and (C.4), and use the
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resulting expressions for A2 to obtain, after tedious but straightforward computations,
A3 =exp
⎛
⎜⎝
(
μ−μ
)2
2ωf
⎞
⎟⎠exp
⎛
⎜⎝− c202
(
τωf μz +
(
μ−μ
))2
ωf
⎞
⎟⎠φ( c0√
ωz
(
μz −τωz
(
μ−μ
)))
× c0τ
√
ωz√
2π
(1−exp(−A31 ·μ))
+exp
(
(μ¯−μ)2
2ωf
)
exp
(
− c
2
0
2
(
τωf μz −(μ¯−μ)
)2
ωf
)
×
[(
μ¯−μ
ωf
+c20
τωf μz −(μ¯−μ)
ωf
)(
1−
(
c0 (μz +τωz (μ¯−μ))√
ωz
))]
≡A32 +A33
and,
A31 ≡c0τ
(
c0 +√ωz
)
μz +
(
ω−1f +c20ω−1f −τ 2ω
3
2
z c0
)
μ.
We have that (i) A33 >0 for all μ whenever μz >μ∗z = μτωf , and (ii) for all μ, A32 >0⇐⇒A31 >0. Inspection of the
definition of A31 reveals that there exists a μ∗∗∗z >0 such that A31 >0 for all μ whenever μz >μ∗∗∗z . Now take μˇz =
max
{
μ∗z ,μ∗∗z ,μ∗∗∗z
}
to conclude about the uninformed agents’ choice. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We first show that for λ=1, the ex ante utility of the informed agents is independent of μ. By a direct
calculation,
I1 ≡ lim
λ→1
∑
∈{buy,np,sell}
Iμ =−c1
√
ωθ +τ 2ωzωωf
c2
exp
(
−1
2
τ 2ωc
2
1μ
2
z
)
, (C.5)
where c1 =
(
1+τ 2ωzω
)− 12 and c2 =τ 2ωzω2 +ωθ , which is independent of μ, as claimed.
Next, we show that there exist a μ˘z >0 and a λ¯∈(0,1) such that for all μz ≥ μ˘z and λ∈ (λ¯,1], the ex ante utility
of the uninformed agents is UU (λ)=Eμ¯[−e−τWˆU ]. By equation (B.12), we need to show that the mapping, μ 	−→
(Jbuyμ +Jnpμ +Jsellμ ) is decreasing when μz is sufficiently large and λ is sufficiently close to one. By equation (B.12) and
the definition of Iμ in equation (B.9),
∂
∂μ
Jbuyμ
=−ζ (μ;μz)
(
μ−μ
)
(1−χ)2
ω f |s
e
(μ−μ)2(1−χ)2
2ω f |s 
(
κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz −γ1
(
μ−μ
)))
+ζ (μ;μz)e
(μ−μ)2(1−χ)2
2ω f |s φ
(
κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz −γ1
(
μ−μ
))) κ√
ωs
γ1
+ζ (μ;μz)γ0
δ2
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ0
(
μ−μ
))
ω f |s +δ2ωs e
(μ−μ)2(1−χ)2
2ω f |s 
(
κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz −γ1
(
μ−μ
)))
≡ζ (μ;μz)
(
jbuy1 +jbuy2 +jbuy3
)
,
and,
∂
∂μ
Jnpμ =ζμz
λ
τω
√
ωs
ζ−1μz
[
φ
(
s¯−ms (μ)√
ωs
)
−φ
(
s−ms (μ)√
ωs
)]
≡ζμz
(jnp1 +jnp2 ),
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and,
∂
∂μ
Jsellμ
=ζ (μ¯;μz) (μ¯−μ)(1−χ)
2
ω f |s
e
(μ¯−μ)2(1−χ)2
2ω f |s
[
1−
(
κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ1 (μ¯−μ)
))]
−ζ (μ¯;μz)e
(μ¯−μ)2(1−χ1)2
2ω f |s φ
(
κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ1 (μ¯−μ)
))
κ√
ωs
γ1
+ζ (μ¯;μz)γ0
δ2
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ0 (μ−μ¯)
)
ω f |s +δ2ωs e
(μ¯−μ)2(1−χ)2
2ω f |s
[
1−
(
κ√
ωs
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ1 (μ¯−μ)
))]
≡ζ (μ¯;μz)
(
jsell1 +jsell2 +jsell3
)
,
where:
ζμz =exp
⎛
⎜⎝− δ2
(
ωs
ωz
μz
)2
2
(
ω f |s +δ2ωs
)
⎞
⎟⎠, ζ (x;μz)≡κ exp
⎛
⎜⎝− δ2
(
ωs
ωz
μz +γ0 (μ−x)
)2
2
(
ω f |s +δ2ωs
)
⎞
⎟⎠.
We have that: for all μ>μ, limμz→∞ jbuy1 <0, limμz→∞ jbuy2 =0 and limμz→∞ jsell1 = limμz→∞ jsell2 =0. Note, also, that
limμz→∞ ∂∂μ J
np
μ ≤0 for all μ, which it does whenever limμz→∞ jnp1 =0. It is the case, since straightforward calculations
leave: jnp1 ∝e−
(
c1μ2z +c2μz+c3
)
for three constants ci, and c1 strictly positive. Therefore, there exists a μ˘z >0 such that, for
all μz >μ˘z , we have jbuy1 +jbuy2 +jsell1 +jsell2 +jnp1 +jnp2 <0. Next, we write
∂
∂μ
(
Jbuyμ +Jnpμ +Jsellμ
)
=ζμz ·
(
ζ (μ;μz)
ζμz
(
jbuy1 +jbuy2 +jbuy3
)
+jnp1 +jnp2 +
ζ (μ¯;μz)
ζμz
(
jsell1 +jsell2 +jsell3
))
≡ζμz · j¯.
Because limλ→1γ0 =0 and, hence, for all finite μz , limλ→1 jbuy3 = limλ→1 jsell3 =0 and limλ→1ζ (x;μz)=ζμz for all x, such
that for any finite μz larger than μ˘z there exists λ¯ depending on μz such that j¯<0. Therefore, we have shown that for all
μ strictly higher than μ, the function Jμ ≡Jbuyμ +Jnpμ +Jsellμ is decreasing in μ. Because Jμ is continuous in the closed
and bounded interval [μ,μ¯], then, by Weierstrass theorem, Jμ takes its absolute maximum on [μ,μ¯]. Suppose that Jμ is
the global maximum, and then the proof follows. Suppose that Jμ is not the global maximum; then, there exists an open
interval of [μ,μ¯] on which Jμ is increasing in μ, which contradicts that Jμ is decreasing in μ for all μ>μ. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that for all μz ≥ μ¯z , where μ¯z is as in Lemma 1, G (c,1)>G (c,0), or equivalently
UI (c,0)
UU (0) >
UI (c,1)
UU (1) . (C.6)
We utilize the expressions for Ibuyμ , Inpμ and Isellμ given in Appendix B and calculate that for λ=0,
Jbuyμ = Ibuyμ =−c0 exp
(
− τ
2ωf c20
2
μ2z
)

(
c0√
ωz
μz
)
,
Jnpμ = Inpμ =0,
Jsellμ =exp
(
μ2
2ωf
)
Isellμ , I
sell
μ =−c0 exp
(
− c
2
0
2
(
τωf μz −μ
)2
ωf
)

(
− c0√
ωz
(μz +τωzμ)
)
.
Therefore, for μz large enough, and Lemma 1,
UI (c,0)
UU (0) =e
τc
√
ω
ωf
Ibuyμ +Isellμ
Jbuyμ +Jsellμ
=eτc
√
ω
ωf
1+ I
sell
μ
Ibuyμ
1+exp
(
μ2
2ωf
) Isellμ
Ibuyμ
,
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where limμz↑∞(Isellμ /Ibuyμ )=0, by the L’Hôpital’s rule. Therefore,
lim
μz↑∞
UI (c,0)
UU (0) =e
τc
√
ω
ωf
. (C.7)
Next, we show that, for λ=1,
lim
μz↑∞
UI (c,1)
UU (1) =e
τc
√
ω
ω f |s,λ=1
exp
(
−μ
2 (1−χ1)2
2ω f |s,λ=1
)
, (C.8)
where ω f |s,λ=1 = limλ→1ω f |s and χ1 = limλ→1χ . By the expressions for Jμ and Iμ in Appendix B and Lemma 2, we
have that for μz large enough,
Jbuyμ¯ = exp
(
μ2 (1−χ1)2
2ω f |s,λ=1
)
·I1
(
κ√
ωs,λ=1
(
ωs,λ=1
ωz
μz − γ¯ μ
))
,
Jnpμ¯ = −
[

(
s¯1 −ms (μ¯)√
ωs,λ=1
)
−
(
s1 −ms (μ¯)√
ωs,λ=1
)]
,
Jsellμ¯ = I1
[
1−
(
κ√
ωs,λ=1
ωs,λ=1
ωz
μz
)]
,
for some γ¯ >0 independent of μz , where ωs,λ=1 = limλ→1ωs, s¯1 = limλ→1 s¯, s1 = limλ→1 s, and I1 is as in equation (C.5)
in the proof of Lemma 2. Hence, we have
UI (c,1)
UU (1) =e
τc
√
ω
ω f |s,λ=1
I1
Jbuyμ¯ +Jnpμ¯ +Jsellμ¯
=eτc
√
ω
ω f |s,λ=1
exp
(
−μ
2 (1−χ1)2
2ω f |s,λ=1
)
1
Z (μz) , (C.9)
where, by straightforward calculations,
Z (μz)≡
(
κ√
ωs,λ=1
(
ωs,λ=1
ωz
μz − γ¯ μ
))
+
[
Jnpμ¯
I1 +
(
− κ√
ωs,λ=1
ωs,λ=1
ωz
μz
)]
exp
(
−μ
2 (1−χ1)2
2ω f |s,λ=1
)
.
We have, by the L’Hôpital’s rule,
lim
μz↑∞
Jnpμ¯
I1 = c¯ · limμz↑∞
φ
(
s¯1−ms(μ¯)√
ωs,λ=1
)
−φ
(
s1−ms(μ¯)√
ωs,λ=1
)
μze
− 12 τ2ωc21μ2z
=0, (C.10)
for some constant c¯>0, where the last equality follows by comparing the loadings of μ2z of the exponentials in the
numerator and the denominator, and using the definition of c1 in equation (C.5). Therefore, limμz↑∞Z (μz)=1 such that
equation (C.8) holds, due to equation (C.9). Proposition III follows from equation (C.7) and equation (C.8) and μ large
enough. 
Proof of equation (5.7). We rely on the following lemma, which we give without proof, as it can be derived by well
known properties of the normal distribution.
Lemma C.1. Let Fs and Ft be two nested information sets, Fs ⊆Ft , and let R be normally distributed with respect to
Fs and Ft , and assume Var(R|Ft) is constant. Then,
x(Ft)≡argmax
x
E
(−e−τxR∣∣Ft)=argmax
x
x
(
E(R|Ft)−x τ2 Var(R|Ft)
)
= E(R|Ft)
τVar(R|Ft) ,
and
E [−exp(−τx(Ft)R)|Fs]=−
(
Var(R|Ft)
Var(R|Fs)
)1/2
exp
(
− E(R|Fs)
2
2Var(R|Fs)
)
.
As for the proof of equation (5.7), we have that in the no-ambiguity benchmark, μ=0, asset returns are
unconditionally normally distributed, so Lemma C.1 implies that the ex ante utility deriving from the unconditional
portfolio choice x0 is,
U0 (λ)=−exp
(
−1
2
E(R)2
Var(R)
)
. (C.11)
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Next, let Fi denote agent-i information set at the trading stage and, accordingly, let xi (Fi) be his optimal demand
conditional on Fi and Ui (λ) his ex ante utility. If the asset return R is normally distributed with respect to Fi and also
unconditionally, then,
Ui (λ)=−
(
Var(R|Fi)
Var(R)
)1/2
exp
(
−1
2
E(R)2
Var(R)
)
=
(
Var(R|Fi)
Var(R)
)1/2
U0 (λ), (C.12)
where the first equality holds by Lemma C.1 and second from the expression of U0 (λ) in equation (C.11). Given returns
R are normally distributed both conditional on price information and unconditionally for μ=0, these results imply that
equation (5.7) holds. 
Finally, we derive the unconditional portfolio choice in equation (5.5) in the general case of a market with ambiguity.
We have:
Proposition C.1. The unconditional portfolio choice, x0, is implicitly defined by
x0 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Eμ
(
Eμ( R|s)
τω f |s e
−τx0Eμ( R|s)
)
Eμ
(
e
−τx0Eμ( R|s)
) , for Eμ(R)>0
0, for Eμ(R)≤0 and Eμ¯ (R)≥0
Eμ¯
(
Eμ¯( R|s)
τω f |s e
−τx0Eμ¯( R|s)
)
Eμ¯
(
e
−τx0Eμ¯( R|s)
) , for Eμ¯ (R)<0
Moreover, x0 ∈
(
0,
Eμ(R)
τω f |s
)
for Eμ(R)>0 and x0 ∈
(
Eμ¯(R)
τω f |s ,0
)
for Eμ¯ (R)<0.
We prove Proposition C.1 through the following lemma.
Lemma C.2. The inner minimization problem in equation (5.5) is solved by μ=μ for x0 >0 and by μ= μ¯ for x0 <0.
Proof. Note that,
min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[−e−τxR]
= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
Eμ
[
e−τx(E( R|s)−x
τ
2 Var( R|s))
∣∣∣s]]
= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
[
−e−τx((μ θ |s(s;μ)−P(s))−x τ2 ω f |s)
]
= min
μ∈[μ,μ¯]
[∫ s
−∞
h(t,μ,x)dt+
∫ s¯
s
h(t,μ,x)dt+
∫ ∞
s¯
h(t,μ,x)dt
]
,
where
h(t,μ,x)≡−e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x τ2 ω f |s)f (t;ms (μ),ωs),
and ms (μ) is defined in (B.4). The integrand h(t,μ,x) is a continuous function of t and μ over the ranges of integration,
and so is its partial derivative with respect to μ,
∂
∂μ
h(t,μ,x)
=e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x τ2 ω f |s)
(
τx(1−χ )f (t;ms (μ),ωs)+ λ
τω
∂
∂t
f (t;ms (μ),ωs)
)
.
Hence, differentiating under the integral sign and rearranging, leaves:
∂
∂μ
Eμ
(−e−τxR)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x
τ
2 ω f |s)
(
τx(1−χ )f (t;ms (μ),ωs)+ λ
τω
∂
∂t
f (t;ms (μ),ωs)
)
dt. (C.13)
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Integrating the second term by parts and simplifying gives,∫ ∞
−∞
e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x
τ
2 ω f |s) λ
τω
∂
∂t
f (t;ms (μ),ωs)dt
=−
∫ ∞
−∞
(
∂
∂t
e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x
τ
2 ω f |s)
)
λ
τω
f (t;ms (μ),ωs)dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
τx
(
χ− λ
τω
∂
∂t
P(t)
)
e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x
τ
2 ω f |s)f (t;ms (μ),ωs)dt.
Plugging back into equation (C.13) yields:
∂
∂μ
Eμ
(−e−τxR)
=τx
∫ ∞
−∞
e−τx((μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t))−x
τ
2 ω f |s)
(
1− λ
τω
∂
∂t
P(t)
)
f (t;ms (μ),ωs)dt.
By the equilibrium price function defined by equation (3.7), it is immediate that λ
τω
∂
∂t P(t)≤1, with the inequality being
strict outside the non-participation region. Therefore, we have:
sign
(
∂
∂μ
Eμ
(−e−τxR))=sign(x),
which proves the original claim. 
Proof of Proposition C.1. We begin by proving that the maximization problem in equation (5.5) has a strictly positive
solution x0 >0 if and only if Eμ(R)>0. By Lemma C.2 we look for x0 >0 which solves
x0 =argmax
x
Eμ
(−e−τxR)=argmax
x
Eμ
(
e
−τx
(
Eμ( R|s)−x τ2 ω f |s
))
. (C.14)
As a first step we show that we can differentiate under the integral sign the maximand in equation (C.14),
Eμ
(
e
−τx
(
Eμ( R|s)−x τ2 ω f |s
))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e
−τx
((
μ θ |s(t;μ)−P(t)
)
−x τ2 ω f |s
)
f
(
t;ms(μ),ωs
)
dt
=
∫ s
−∞
h
(
t,μ,x
)
dt+
∫ s¯
s
h
(
t,μ,x
)
dt+
∫ ∞
s¯
h
(
t,μ,x
)
dt
which we can, as h
(
t,μ,x
)
and ∂
∂x
h
(
t,μ,x
)
are continuous functions of t and x over the ranges of integration.
Because Eμ(R|s)=μθ |s(s;μ)−P(s) is linear in s over the very same ranges of integration, the expression
Eμ
(
Eμ(R|s)e−τx
(
Eμ( R|s)−x τ2 ω f |s
))
is also differentiable under the integral sign. Then, the first-order condition for
the maximization problem in equation (5.5) for x>0 gives
G(x)≡Eμ
[(
Eμ(R|s)−xτω f |s
)
e
−τx
(
Eμ( R|s)−x τ2 ω f |s
)]
=0, (C.15)
with second-order condition
G′ (x)=−τEμ
[(
ω f |s +
(
Eμ(R|s)−xτω f |s
)2)
e
−τx
(
Eμ( R|s)−x τ2 ω f |s
)]
<0. (C.16)
Notice that
G(0)=Eμ
(
Eμ(R|s)
)
=Eμ(R),
which, together with equation (C.16) implies that a strictly positive solution to G(x)=0 exists only if Eμ(R)>0. Hence,
take Eμ(R)>0 and define
x¯≡ Eμ(R)
τω f |s
.
We will show that G(x¯)<0, or equivalently,
G(x¯)<0⇔Eμ
[(
Eμ(R|s)− x¯τω f |s
)
e
−τ x¯Eμ( R|s)
]
<0⇔Eμ(R)>EP˜μ
(
Eμ(R|s)
)
, (C.17)
where
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣∣∣F(s) ≡
e
−τ x¯Eμ( R|s)
E
[
e
−τ x¯Eμ( R|s)
] .
Given that Eμ(R|s) is a strictly decreasing function of s and x¯>0, the measure P˜ assigns larger weight to
states s in which Eμ(R|s) is negative and lower weight to states s in which Eμ(R|s) is positive, which implies
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EP˜μ
(
Eμ(R|s)
)
<Eμ
(
Eμ(R|s)
)
and therefore the last inequality in (C.17). Since G(0)>0 and G(x¯)<0, then there exists
a value x0 ∈
(
0,
Eμ(R)
τω f |s
)
that solves equation (C.15); since G′(x)<0 the solution to equation (C.15) is unique. Rearranging
equation (C.15) and simplifying gives
x0 =
Eμ
( Eμ( R|s)
τω f |s e
−τx0Eμ( R|s)
)
Eμ
(
e
−τx0Eμ( R|s)
) .
The case for Eμ¯ (R)<0 and x0 <0 is similar ad is omitted. Finally, for both Eμ(R)≤0 and Eμ¯ (R)≥0, the function
minμ∈[μ,μ¯]Eμ
(−e−τxR) is decreasing (increasing) in x for all x≥0 (x≤0) such that the unconditional portfolio problem
is solved by x0 =0. 
Finally, to prove Proposition 4, we rely on the following lemma:
Lemma C.3. Let λ>0. Then for each ∈R, there exists a μˆz >0 depending on  such that for all μz ≥ μˆz, the equilibrium
price in equation (3.7) satisfies Eμ(P(s))< for all μ∈[μ,μ¯].
Proof. By market clearing, and the definition of the compound signal s in equation (3.5), the equilibrium price
satisfies:
P(s)=
(
λ
τω
)−1(
−μz +s+(1−λ) μ f |s (s;μ
∗ (s))−P(s)
τω f |s
)
, (C.18)
where, using equations (A.2)–(A.3) and the expression for the equilibrium price in equation (3.7),
μ f |s
(
s;μ∗ (s))−P(s)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
δ
(
s−s), for s<s
0, for s∈ [s,s¯]
δ(s¯−s), for s> s¯
(C.19)
where δ is as in the first of equation (B.8). Plugging equation (C.19) into equation (C.18), and taking expectation under
a generic prior μ,
λ
τω
·Eμ(P(s))
=−μz +ms (μ)+(1−λ)δ Eμ
((
s−s)Is<s +(s¯−s)Is>s¯)
τω f |s
=−μz +ms (μ)
+(1−λ)δ
s
(
s−ms(μ)√
ωs
)
+ s¯
(
1−
(
s¯−ms(μ)√
ωs
))
−ms (μ)+
∫ s¯
s
td(t;ms (μ),ωs)
τω f |s
(C.20)
where, using the property of the truncated normal distribution,∫ s¯
s
td(t;ms (μ),ωs)
=ms (μ)
(

(
s¯−ms (μ)√
ωs
)
−
(
s−ms (μ)√
ωs
))
−
(
φ
(
s¯−ms (μ)√
ωs
)
−φ
(
s−ms (μ)√
ωs
))√
ωs
and ms (μ) is as in equation (B.4). Replacing this expression into equation (C.20), and rearranging terms, yields,
Eμ(P(s))
=
(
λ
τω
)−1[(
−μz +ms (μ)+ (1−λ)δ
√
ωs
τω f |s
(
g
(
s−ms (μ)√
ωs
)
−g
(
s¯−ms (μ)√
ωs
)))]
, (C.21)
where for any t ∈R, we define the function, g(t)≡ t(t)+φ(t). The claim follows by taking the limits in
equation (C.21). 
Proof of Proposition 4. We first establish that for μz large, there exists a λ¯∈(0,1), such that the value of price information
in equation (5.6),
Gp (λ)=− 1
τ
ln
(UU (λ)
U0 (λ)
)
,
is continuous in λ for all λ∈ (λ¯,1]. By equation (B.12) UU (λ) is continuous in λ over some some range (λ¯,1] if μU is
constant over (λ¯,1]; indeed, for μz large, by Lemma 2 there exists a λ¯ such that μU = μ¯ for all λ∈ (λ¯,1]. By Lemma
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C.3, Eμ(R)>0 for μz large, and therefore by Proposition C.1 and Lemma C.2, U0 (λ)=Eμ
(−e−τx0R) for all λ, where by
equation (C.15) and the implicit function theorem, x0 is a continuous function of λ for all λ>0.
Secondly, we establish that for μz large Gp (1) is negative for μ sufficiently high. Note that,
Gp (1)=− 1
τ
ln
( UU (1)
UI (c,1)
)
− 1
τ
ln
(UI (c,1)
U0 (1)
)
. (C.22)
Moreover, in λ=1, the asset realized returns are independent of θ , such that by Lemma C.1 and equation (C.12),
UI (c,1)
U0 (1) =e
τc
√
Var(R|θ,p)
Var(R)
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
=eτc
√
ωε
Var(R)|λ=1
,
and by equation (C.8),
lim
μz↑∞
UU (1)
UI (c,1) =e
−τc
√
Var(R|p)|λ=1
ω
exp
(
μ2 (1−χ1)2
2ω f |s,λ=1
)
.
Therefore, taking the limit in equation (C.22) and rearranging terms leaves:
lim
μz↑∞
Gp (1)= 12τ ln
(
Var(R)|λ=1
Var(R|p)|λ=1
)
− μ
2 (1−χ1)2
2τω f |s,λ=1
. (C.23)
Equation (C.23) and continuity of Gp (λ) on λ∈ (λ¯,1] imply that there exist values μz >0 and μ>0 such that Gp (λ)<0
for all μz >μz and μ>μ and λ∈ (λ¯,1]. 
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